OFTP2 TLS 1.3 Upgrade Checklist: 48 Days Until the 2027 Deadline
If you exchange VDA 4984 DELFOR forecasts or VDA 4987 DESADV despatch advices with German OEMs, the files almost certainly travel over OFTP2 (Odette File Transfer Protocol, RFC 5024). The protocol itself is unchanged - but the security envelope around every session is being rewritten, and the deadline is now measured in weeks, not quarters.
What changed: the OFTP2 2026 profile in one paragraph
Odette updated the governing documents in March 2026: OP08 - OFTP2 Implementation Guideline v3.2 (normative configuration, certificates, TLS) and OP09 - OFTP2 Interoperability Testing v3.3 (the conformance test cases). On top of these, the Odette OFTP2 Experts Group announced that TLS 1.0 is declared obsolete and the minimum certificate key length rises to 3072 bits, aligned with VDA 4933 Teil 1 on the German side. Vendor guidance published as recently as November 2026 confirms the industry-wide expectation: TLS 1.3 mandatory from 1 January 2027, with RSASSA-PSS or ECDSA signatures replacing legacy RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 and SHA-1, and post-quantum hybrid key exchange suites being prepared for the next profile revision.
Compliant software and parameters: the configuration checklist
Work through this list against every OFTP2 endpoint you operate - your own server, your EDI provider's managed service, and each direct partner connection:
- TLS version: TLS 1.3 only (RFC 8446). Disable TLS 1.0/1.1 entirely; TLS 1.2 is acceptable only as a documented fallback until your last partner cuts over.
- Cipher suites:
TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256. No CBC, no legacy renegotiation. - Certificates: X.509 with minimum 3072-bit RSA keys (or ECDSA P-256/P-384), SHA-256 or better signatures, maximum 12-13 months validity. Build rotation into operations now.
- File-level security (CMS): signing via RSASSA-PSS or ECDSA with SHA-256/384; encryption via AES-GCM or ChaCha20-Poly1305. Reject SHA-1 in your Send Signature Policy (SSP) and Send Receipt Policy (SRP).
- Receipts: signed EERP/NERP end-to-end responses must keep flowing - partners use them as audit evidence, and they break silently when certificate chains change.
- Post-quantum readiness: check your vendor's roadmap for hybrid key exchange (e.g. X25519+ML-KEM). Not mandatory for 2027, but the 2026 profile names it as the preparation target.
Certificate CA whitelist: who issues, who accepts
The practical question is never "is my certificate valid?" but "does my partner's OFTP2 server trust the CA that issued it?" VW Group Supply publishes its accepted OFTP parameters in the OFTP-Parameter specification (v2.0, updated 2026-09-14), including the certificate authorities approved for ODETTE-ID authentication. Odette's OFTP2 and Digital Certificate Policy defines the baseline. Action items:
- Pull the current CA whitelist from each partner's guideline (VW Group Supply portal, BMW partner documentation, Stellantis EDI portal) - they differ.
- Order new 3072-bit certificates only from a CA on every key partner's list; a perfectly valid certificate from the wrong CA is a connection failure on 2027-01-01.
- Map each certificate to the Odette ID it authenticates, and record issuer, fingerprint and expiry in your inventory before testing starts.
Odette Conformance Tool: interoperability testing in five steps
Conformance against OP09 v3.3 is the ticket to a calm January. Run it in this order:
- Self-test first: run the Odette Conformance Tool against your own server for both directions (you-initiated and partner-initiated sessions) with mutual TLS authentication using the new certificates.
- Session establishment: verify TLS 1.3 handshake, cipher suite negotiation, and client-certificate authentication on the inbound side - outbound-only testing is where most "worked in staging" surprises live.
- File transfer cases: encrypted and signed transfer, large-file credit-window handling, restart after an interrupted session, and EERP/NERP receipt delivery.
- Partner test windows: schedule interop tests with every trading partner. Confirm who initiates, on which schedule, and re-validate firewall rules, DNS and port 3305 (or your agreed port) after the TLS profile change.
- Evidence pack: capture logs, certificate fingerprints and timestamps for each session. Your OEM's security questionnaire will ask for exactly this.
The deadline countdown
| Window | Action |
|---|---|
| Now – 2026-11-30 | Endpoint inventory; order 3072-bit certificates from whitelisted CAs; confirm vendor TLS 1.3 support |
| 2026-12-01 – 12-15 | Stage the new profile in a test environment; verify signed EERP flows; document rollback |
| 2026-12-16 – 12-31 | Odette Conformance Tool + partner interoperability tests; collect evidence |
| 2027-01-01 | Cut over partner by partner; monitor failed handshakes daily for two weeks |
Don't forget the payload
A flawless TLS 1.3 channel does nothing for the VDA messages inside it. Migration windows are when partners re-test message mappings - and a channel that finally works surfaces content errors that transfer failures used to hide. Before your first production file, validate locally: paste your DELFOR into the VDA 4984 validator and your DESADV into the VDA 4987 validator. Both run entirely in your browser, so test files with real part numbers never leave your machine. For the message-content side of the 2026/2027 transition, see our companion guide VDA 4905 to VDA 4984 migration guide and the broader OFTP2 TLS 1.3 migration checklist for the post-cutover phase.